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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This case is before the Court on a writ of certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals
from its decision in Bluemel v. State, 2006 UT App 141, 134 P.3d 181, reh'g denied
(May 25, 2006), Addendum A. The Supreme Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 78-2-2(5).

ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Issue 1: Whether the court of appeals applied the correct standards for reviewing
allegations of a violation of rule 11 violation raised for the first time in a habeas petition.

V

Issue 2: Whether the court of appeals erred in its evaluation of the interests-of-justice
exception to the one-year statute of limitations for habeas petitions.
On certiorari, this Court reviews the decision of the court of appeals for
correctness. State v. Visser, 2000 UT 88, \ 9, 22 P.3d 1242.

OPINION BELOW
The court of appeals opinion under review is Bluemel v. State, 2006 UT App 141,
134 P.3d 181, reWg denied (May 25, 2006).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution
Article 1, section 12 of the Utah Constitution
Utah Code Annotated, § 78-2a-3
Utah Code Annotated, § 78-35a-102
Utah Code Annotated, § 78-35a-104
Utah Code Annotated, § 78-35a-107
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 65B
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 11
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 11

VI

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Procedural History
On October 4, 2001, Respondent Tammy Bluemel ("Ms. Bluemel"), was charged
with seven counts of Rape, a First Degree Felony, and one count of Supplying Alcohol to
a Minor, a Class A Misdemeanor. (Criminal Case No. 011404069, hereinafter "Crim.
R."). She was represented at the trial by Victor Lawrence. (Crim R. 9, 20). Mr.
Lawrence has never withdrawn from representing Ms. Bluemel. On December 5, 2001,
Ms. Bluemel entered guilty pleas to three counts of rape, and one count of supplying
alcohol to a minor, while the remaining four counts of rape were dismissed. (Crim. R.
29-31). She was sentenced on March 27, 2002, and received three indeterminate terms of
not less than five years and which may be life, and one indeterminate term not to exceed
one year, all to be run concurrently. (Crim R. 44-45). Ms. BluemePs counsel did not file
a notice of appeal nor did he file a Petition for Post Conviction Relief and Supporting
Memorandum, alleging that she entered an involuntary and unknowing plea, and received
ineffective assistance of counsel, though she requested he do so. (Civil Case No.
040401880, hereinafter "Civil R."). Upon request for decision from Ms. Bluemel, the
trial court reviewed the petition and found that it merited a response from the
government. The trial court thus ordered a copy of the petition served upon the Attorney
General. (Civil R. 23). The government filed a Motion to Dismiss the Petition, and
supporting memorandum on November 4, 2004. (Civil R. 35-86). Ms. Bluemel then
filed a Memorandum in Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss on January 31, 2005. (Civil
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R. 116-126). The government filed a Notice to Submit for Decision and the trial court
issued a decision granting the government's Motion to Dismiss the Petition as untimely,
finding no claim warranted a waiving of the untimely filing. (Civil R. 131-133). Ms.
Bluemel appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed the court's dismissal. Bluemel v.
State, 2006 UT App 141, 134 P.3d 181, reh 'g denied (May 25, 2006). The State of Utah
filed a Petition for Rehearing on April 28, 2006, but that petition was denied. On June
27, 2006, the State of Utah filed a petition for writ of certiorari, which was granted on
September 15,2006.
Statement of Facts
On October 4, 2001, Ms. Bluemel was charged with seven counts of rape and one
count of supplying alcohol to a minor. (Crim. R. 4). On October 24, 2001, attorney
Victor Lawrence ("Mr. Lawrence" or "trial counsel") entered an appearance on behalf of
Ms. Bluemel. (Crim. R. 20). On December 5, 2001 Ms. Bluemel entered guilty pleas to
three counts of rape and one count of supplying alcohol to a minor, while the four other
counts of rape were dismissed. (Crim. R. 22-29). When Ms. Bluemel entered her pleas,
she was under the influence of eight prescription drugs:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

600 mg of Neurotin three times daily (1800 mg per day)
150 mg of Effexor twice daily (300 mg per day)
5 mg Xanax daily
50 mg Trazadone daily
700 mg of Soma four times daily (2800 mg daily)
800 mg of Ibuprofen three times daily (2400 mg daily)
Macrodantin; and
Axid

(Civil R. 121).
viii

Prior to accepting her pleas, the trial court informed Ms. Bluemel of the maximum
possible punishments, most of the rights which she was waiving by entering a guilty plea,
and that she would have thirty days in which to move to withdraw her plea. (Crim. R.
57:2-4). Significantly, the trial court judge did not inquire as to whether she was under
the influence of any drugs or alcohol, nor as to whether she was knowingly and
voluntarily entering her pleas. (Crim. R. 57). She was also not informed by the trial
court the she was presumed innocent, could compel witnesses to testify on her behalf, or
that her right of appeal was limited. (Crim. R. 57). The trial court asked for the factual
basis of the plea, and the terms of the plea agreement. (Crim. R. 57:2, 4). Ms. Bluemel.
then entered her pleas, which the trial court accepted as knowing and voluntary. (Crim.
R. 57:4-5). Ms. Bluemel was sentenced on March 27, 2002, and received three
indeterminate terms of not less than five years and which may be life, and one
indeterminate term not to exceed one year, all to be run concurrently. (Crim. R. 44-45).
She was taken into custody at that time and remains at the Utah State Prison. (Crim. R.
44).
Immediately following her sentencing, Ms. Bluemel told Mr. Lawrence that she
wanted to appeal. (Civil R. 113). He advised her that he would handle the appeal and
that she had one year in which to file an appeal. (Civil R. 113). During Ms. BluemePs
first year in prison, Mr. Lawrence visited Ms. Bluemel approximately three times,
although not during her first thirty days in prison, and each time informed her that he was
working on her appeal. (Civil R. 113). Ms. Bluemel continued to write to and call Mr.
Lawrence, however his office eventually refused her calls and would not respond to her
ix

letters. (Civil R. 112-113). After one year, Ms. Bluemel stopped trying to contact her
attorney, and began seeking new counsel. (Civil R. 113). Ms. Bluemel hired current
defense counsel in October of 2003 to research her options. After meeting with Ms.
Bluemel, reviewing the evidence, and researching the law, defense counsel filed a
Petition for Post Conviction Relief on May 3, 2004. (Civil R. 17, 19, 112, 124). The
government moved to Dismiss the Petition, and after a response from Ms. Bluemel, the
trial court granted the government's Motion to Dismiss, finding that there were
insufficient interests of justice such to waive the untimely filing of the Petition. (Civil R.
36-38, 99-126, 130-133). Ms. Bluemel, through counsel, appealed and the Court of
Appeals reversed. State v. Bluemel, 2006 UT App 141,115-17, 134 P.3d 181. The State
petitioned for a rehearing and that petition was denied on May 25, 2006. The State
petitioned for writ of certiorari, and that writ was granted on September 15, 2006.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Court of Appeals correctly determined that the interests of justice warrant
waiving the untimely filing of Respondent's Petition for Post-Conviction Relief The
violations of Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure exceeded simple,
harmless, technical violations, and rose to noncompliance with the constitutional
requirements of Rule 11. This noncompliance caused Respondent's plea to be
unknowing and involuntary. Where Ms. Bluemel did not enter an knowing and voluntary
plea and did not receive effective assistance of counsel throughout and following the trial
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court proceedings, the interests of justice require waiving the one year time period, and
warrant post conviction relief for Respondent.

ARGUMENT

I.

THE COURT OF APPEALS DECISION SHOULD BE AFFIRMED
WHERE RULE 11 VIOLATIONS RENDERED THE PLEA
UNKNOWING AND INVOLUNTARY.

A plea is unconstitutional where it was unknowing and involuntary as a result of
the trial court's failure to advise the defendant of her constitutional rights on the record.
Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969); State v. Stilling, 856 P.2d 666, 671 (Utah
Ct.App.1993). The Rules of Criminal Procedure set forth rules governing pleas in order
to insure that a defendant who pleads guilty knowingly and voluntarily waives the
protections the constitution guarantees him prior to a trial verdict. State v. Corwell, 2005
UT 28, ^[11,114 P.3d 569. Where the plea is not knowing and voluntary, it violates the
defendant's due process rights under the Constitution. State v. Mora, 2003 UT App 117,
T| 22, 69 P.3d 838. If a defendant is not fully informed of his rights prior to pleading
guilty, the guilty plea cannot be voluntary. Id. Where a plea is not voluntary, a court's
acceptance of that plea is unjust. Id.
The burden of ensuring strict compliance with the rules governing taking of pleas
rests on the trial court. State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309, 1312-13 (Utah 1987) appeal
after remand on other grounds, 779 P.2d 1133 (Utah 1987). The trial court must
establish on the record that the plea is knowing and voluntary. State v. Visser, 2000 UT
88, f 11, 22 P.3d 1242. If a written plea statement is used to demonstrate compliance
with the rules governing pleas, the plea statement must be properly incorporated in the
l

record. State v. Maguire, 830 P.2d 216, 217 (Utah 1991), reversed on other grounds, 957
P.2d 598 (Utah 1998). Proper incorporation includes an inquiry as to whether or not the
defendant has, in fact, read and understood the statement, a requirement that is not
satisfied by asking if the defendant has any questions. Id. Where the court does not
establish that the defendant has read and understands the written plea statement, that
statement does not become part of the record. Mora, 2003 UT App 117 at ^j 22, 69 P.3d
838.
On appeal the court is entitled to examine the entire record, but facts not contained
in the record may not be considered. Utah R. of App. P. 11. It follows that where the
written plea statement was not incorporated into the record, it may not be reviewed to
determine whether or not the plea was knowing and voluntary. Mora, 2003 UT App 117,
If 20, 69 P.3d 838. In this case the trial court did not "strictly comply" with Rule 11 by
failing to notify the defendant, on the record, of several of the important fundamental
rights she was waiving. State v. Bluemel, 2006 UT App 141, % 15-17, 134 P.3d 181.
A. Where The Court Failed To Strictly Comply With Rule 11, As
Opposed To Committing A Technical Violation, The Plea Is
Unknowing And Involuntary.
A court must strictly comply with Rule 11 because Rule 11 is a constitutionally
based rule, crafted to ensure compliance with requirements of due process. Stilling, 856
P.2d at 671. Strict compliance can be accomplished even if the court commits a
"technical violation" of the rule. Compare United States v. Timmreck, 441 U.S. 780, 784
(1979) (A technical violation does not indicate a constitutionally infirm plea) with
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Corwell, 2005 UT 28 at^f 11, 114 P.3d 569. Rule 11 is not meant to create a rote script
the court must read through at the time of sentencing. Utah R. Crim. P. 11, Advisory
Committee Note. Courts are permitted to convey the rights a defendant waives when she
pleads guilty in whatever way they see fit. Id. Though no script is required, the court
must demonstrate that a defendant knowingly waives each of the rights on the record.
State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309 (Utah 1987). The record may include a written
statement in advance of the plea if and only if the trial court properly incorporates such a
statement into the record. Maguire, 830 P.2d at 217.
A trial judge should refuse to accept a plea until the court has found that the
defendant knows of certain rights, including the right to a speedy public trial before an
impartial jury, the right to the presumption of innocence, the right to compel the
attendance of defense witnesses, and that by pleading guilty the defendant's right to
appeal is limited. Corwell, 2005 UT 28 at If 11, 114 P.3d 569.. The defendant must also
understand the minimum and maximum sentences. Id. The requirement that a court must
"strictly comply" with Rule 11 means a defendant must state, on the record, that she
understands and waives each of these rights.

Where a court fails to strictly comply with

Rule 11, the plea is unknowing and therefore involuntary. Id. (citing Visser, 2000 UT 88
at 1f 11, 22 P.3d 1242); State v. Ostler, 2000 UT App 28 at f 11, 996 P.2d 1065 (Sixth
Amendment right to counsel embodied in Rule 11); Gibbons, 740 P.2d at 1312 (Utah
1987) (requirement protects a defendant's right to due process); Stilling, 856 P.2d at 671
("the procedural rules are meant, to some extent at least, to incorporate constitutional
protections")(citing United States v. Newman, 912 F.2d 1119 (9th Cir. 1990) and Salazar
3

v. Warden 852 P.2d 988, 992 (Utah 1993)). Compliance with Rule 11(e) creates a
presumption that the plea was voluntarily entered. State v. Gamblin, 2000 UT 44, ^ 11, 1
P.3d 1108.
Courts are not required to follow a rote script to ensure strict compliance, but the
Supreme Court and Court of Appeals calls any occasion where a court does not precisely
state every right that is waived exactly as stated in Rule 11a "technical violation." See
e.g. Salazar, 852 P.2d at 992; State v. Dean, 2002 UT App 323, If 12, 57 P.3d 1106,
rev'd, 2004 UT 63, If 23, 95 P.3d 276. Technical violations are not constitutional
violations, and do not affect the validity of pleas. Salazar, 852 P.2d at 992. Because of
the words used in current Rule 11 jurisprudence, a court can commit "technical
violations" and still strictly comply with Rule 11 and constitutional due process. Id.
Petitioner argues that the violations here fall into the category of "technical
violations" because "[Ms. Bluemel] never claimed she would not have pleaded guilty if
she had been apprised of those rights." (Petitioner's Brief, p. 17). This further
demonstrates the lack of clarity concerning a technical violation as opposed to
noncompliance, and the lack of clarity surrounding the term "technical violation."
Failure to strictly comply means a trial court failed to comply with Rule 11 to the extent
that the record lacks sufficient evidence to show that the defendant knowingly and
voluntarily waived her rights. State v. Lehi, 2003 UT App 212, f 16-17, 73 P.3d 985.
The trial court's failure to comply with Rule 11 rendered Ms. Bluemel's plea unknowing
and involuntary, and violated her constitutional rights.
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Petitioner next argues that a defendant is permitted to withdraw her plea only for
"good cause" when she does so on direct appeal. (Petitioner's Brief, p. 10). This
argument is incorrect because it presupposes that all Rule 11 violations are technical and
that a Rule 11 violation would never be "good cause." While it is certainly true that more
than a technical violation is required to withdraw a plea post conviction, that burden is
met where a Rule 11 violation renders a plea unknowing and involuntary.
Petitioner points out that on a motion for post conviction relief, a petitioner must
show that the plea was in fact not knowing and voluntary. (Petitioner's Brief, p. 10).
Petitioner's rule is incorrect. The trial court bears the burden of ensuring that both
constitutional and Rule 11 requirements are complied with when a guilty plea is entered.
Gibbons, 740 P.2d at 1312. On a motion for post conviction relief, a petitioner must
show that the record is insufficient to support that the plea was knowing and voluntary,
which is quite different from proving that the plea was in fact not knowing and voluntary.
Mora, 2003 UT App 117 at Tf 18. As the Court of Appeals stated in Bluemel, the record
is insufficient to support such a conclusion. 2006 UT App 141 at ^ 15-17, 134 P.3d 181.
Petitioner also points out that the scope of Rule 11 differs from the scope of the
constitutional rules upon which Rule 11 is based. It is correct that Rule 11 is slightly
broader than the constitutional requirements, which explains why courts may commit a
"technical violation" without committing a constitutional violation. From this rule it
follows that where a court violates Rule 11 and that violation is more than "technical,"
the violation is a constitutional violation rendering the plea constitutionally infirm. In
effect, Petitioner either misunderstands the technical-strict compliance dichotomy, or he
5

is arguing that because some Rule 11 violations are not constitutional violations, no Rule
11 violations are constitutional. A comparison of the cases cited by Petitioner reveals
that the Rule 11 violation here is beyond technical and should be treated as a
constitutional violation. The Rule 11 violations in this case are beyond technical, and
cause the guilty plea to be constitutionally infirm.
B. Bluemel Does Not Conflict With Cases From Other Jurisdictions.
Petitioner cites to a series of cases that are allegedly inconsistent with Bluemel
because they hold that particular Rule 11 violations are insufficient to support a claim of
a constitutional violation. (Peitioner's Brief, p.l 1-13). As stated above, a technical
violation of Rule 11 is not sufficient to support post conviction relief. No case cited on
page 11-13 of Petitioner's brief conflicts with Bluemel Each case where a Rule 11
violation does not rise to a constitutional violation is a mere technical violation. On the
other hand, each case that is similar to this case is a failure to strictly comply and is a
constitutional violation.
In the first of these cases, United States v. Timmreck, a defendant claimed that the
plea process violated Rule 11 where the trial court did not tell the defendant of a
mandatory parole term. 441 U.S. 780, 784 (1979). The court did inform the defendant of
the minimum and maximum terms of his sentence, as required by the Constitution and
Rule 11, and the prison term plus the parole term fell within those parameters. Id.
Though the court called this a technical violation, they did not point to any particular
clause of federal Rule 11 that was not fulfilled. Id. There was not even a "technical
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violation" in Timmreck. Since the defendant did not claim that the alleged Rule 11
violation rose to the level of a constitutional violation, the Supreme Court held that such a
violation could not be raised on a petition for post conviction relief. This is different
from the present case because the Rule 11 violation resulted in a record inadequate to
support a finding that the plea was knowing and voluntary.
Petitioner next cites to U.S. v. Grewal, another case where the record does contain
adequate factual basis to determine that the Petitioner's plea was knowing and voluntary.
825 F.2d 220 (9th Cir. 1987). In that case, Petitioner alleged that his conviction was
unconstitutional because the trial court did not tell him the maximum range of his
sentence, or that his sentence could include restitution. Id. at 222. While the maximum
sentence was not communicated in the colloquy or in a written plea statement, the
maximum sentence was incorporated into the record by way of a presentence report. Id.
Mr. Grewal stated on the record that he read and understood the presentence report. Id.
Accordingly, the record in that case complied with Rule 11 and the Constitution. The
record in this case does not establish whether Ms. Bluemel knew or understood several
important constitutional rights, or knew that her plea constituted an admission of all the
facts required for the conviction. Her plea statement was not incorporated into the
record.
People v. Holvey, a thirty-two year old Illinois case, is also distinguishable from
Bluemel 308 N.E.2d 622 (111. App. 1974). In that case, the trial court failed to establish
on the record the factual basis for the guilty plea. The trial court established the basis for
the plea as follows:
7

The Court: Are you, Mr. Holvey, pleading guilty because you believe to be guilty
in fact?
Defendant: Yes, sir.
The Court: Do you believe yourself in fact guilty or are you merely pleading guilty
because somebody has advised you to do so?
Defendant: I know I am guilty sir.
Id. at 623. In clarifying its state rule, the Illinois Appeals Court looked to the similarly
worded federal Rule 11. In denying the motion to withdraw, the court found it important
that there was no claim the record was insufficient to support the conviction, but Mr.
Hovley merely claimed a Rule 11 violation.
Petitioner next cites to Powers v. State, which involves a similar claim where the
factual basis for the plea was not sufficiently stated on the record, but Rule 11 was
otherwise satisfied. 942 S.W.2d 551 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996). The Tennessee court found
it highly significant that defendants may strategically choose to avoid going into great
detail when establishing the factual basis for the plea. Id. Where a defendant stated as
little as possible for the factual basis for his guilty plea, and petitioned to withdraw the
plea on that same basis, courts should deny such petitions. Such defendants "at best,
invited error." Id. at 555.
Furthermore, Rule ll(e)(4)(A-B) of the Utah rules explains the factual basis
requirement for a plea, and is totally consistent with Bluemel, Powers, and Holvey.
While the defendant must understand the rights he waives, the factual basis requirement
is met if the factual basis:
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"[Establishes that the charged crime was actually committed by the defendant or,
if the defendant refuses or is otherwise unable to admit culpability, that the
prosecution has sufficient evidence to establish a substantial risk of conviction."
Utah R. Crim. P. Rule 11(e)(4)(B). North Carolina v. AIford clearly demonstrates that a
defendant need not state the factual basis for the guilty plea OQ the record in order for the
plea agreement to be constitutional. 400 U.S. 25 (1970) (Defendant can maintain
innocence and plead guilty in order to obtain favorable plea agreement). Thus, a plea
where a defendant is not informed of her rights is very different from a plea where a
defendant understands his rights, but strategically chooses to state as little a basis for the
plea as he can. While Powers and Holvey may still be valid law, they do not conflict
with Bluemel and cannot be relied on in this case. Even so, Holvey directly conflicts with
governing law in this jurisdiction. Holvey states that "substantial compliance" with Rule
11 is sufficient, while this jurisdiction requires strict compliance. 308N.E.2d at 624,
compare Corwell, 2005 UT 28 at ^ 11, 114 P.3d 569 (Substantial compliance with Rule
11 is insufficient); State v. Valencia, 776 P.2d 1332, 1334 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (Same).
None of the cases Petitioner cites from other jurisdictions conflict with Bluemel.
C. Bluemel Dots Not Conflict With Prior Court Of Appeals' Opinions.
Petitioner next cites several Court of Appeals opinions for the proposition that
Bluemel is a significant break from prior decisions by the Court of Appeals. A careful
look at these cases demonstrates that Bluemel does not conflict with any of these cases.
The first case is Moench v. State. (Petitioner's Brief, p. 12). Beyond not supporting

Petitioner's position, Moench is quite contrary to it. In that case, the Court of appeals
held:
"While it is the responsibility of the trial judge to establish that strict compliance
with Rule 11 is established, strict compliance can be accomplished by multiple
means so long as no requirement of the rule is omitted and so long as the record
reflects that the requirement has been fulfilled"
Moench v. State, 2004 UT App 57, f 17, 88 P.3d 353. In Moench the petitioner was
denied relief, but the Court of Appeals stated that relief was denied because the petitioner
was informed of each of his rights he was waiving under Rule 11. The trial court is not
required to tell the defendant of collateral consequences of his guilty plea. Utah R. Crim.
P. 11(e)(8). It would follow the above excerpt in Moench that where a requirement of the
rule is omitted, and the record does not reflect that the requirement has been fulfilled, the
trial judge failed to established strict compliance, which is constitutional compliance.
Petitioner next references State v. Lehi, 2003 UT App. 212, 73 P.3d 985. Both the
holding and the result of State v. Lehi are contrary to Petitioner's position. In that case,
the defendant, Mr. Lehi, pleaded guilty to driving under the influence with two prior
convictions in exchange for dismissal of other charges and a ninety-day sentence
recommendation. Id. at f 4. No blood or breath alcohol test was administered because
Mr. Lehi refused, but several witnesses at a preliminary hearing testified that Mr. Lehi
was impaired. At his plea colloquy the court properly incorporated the plea affidavit into
the record, but neither the affidavit nor the colloquy made reference to the preliminary
hearing. After pleading guilty, the judge departed from the sentencing recommendation.
The petitioner attempted to withdraw his plea, but the judge denied that request.
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The Lehi court quoted McCarthy v. United States to emphasize "there is no
adequate substitute for demonstrating in the record at the time the plea is entered Hat
defendant's understanding of the nature of the charge against him." 349 U.S. 459, 470
(1969) (emphasis in original). An inconsistency between the information and the plea
affidavit showed that Mr. Lehi did not fully understand his rights. Though mentioned,
the record from the preliminary hearing was not properly incorporated and could not be
used to clarify certain ambiguities. The Court of Appeals stated:
"We acknowledge it is quite possible that on a purely subjective level, Defendant
actually did understand the nature and elements of the DUI charge. However,
since such an understanding is not evidenced from the plea record before us, we
cannot conclude that the trial court adequately ensured that Defendant understood
the charge."
LehU 2003 UT App 212 at If 14, n.5, 73 P.3d 985. As the record in Lehi did not contain
the facts as gathered at the preliminary hearing, the record in this case does not include
the written plea affidavit. Upon examining the entire record, nothing suggests that Ms.
Bluemel understood her right to presumption of innocence, the State's burden, her right
to compel witnesses, or that a plea is an admission of all the facts. Bluemel, 2006 UT
App 141 at % 16, 134 P.3d 181. Where the trial court's failure to comply with Rule 11
makes it impossible to conclusively determine whether or not defendant's plea was
knowing and voluntary, the Rule 11 violation is a constitutional violation and the
interests of justice require that she be allowed to withdraw her guilty plea. Id.
Peguero v. United States does not conflict with Bluemel either. (Petitioner's Brief
p. 16-17). In that case, the trial court's failure to inform a defendant of his right to appeal
his sentence was not a sufficient basis to allow the defendant to withdraw his plea
li

because the record established he did know of his right to appeal. 526 U.S. 23 (1999).
Specifically, the record established that Mr. Peguero actually instructed his attorney to
appeal the sentence and that he was aware of his right to do so. Though the Supreme
Court in that case stated that actual prejudice is required, the Court also implied that if the
record did not show defendant knew of his right to appeal the sentence, that absence
would have been sufficient to show actual prejudice. Id. at 26.
D. Where A Rule 11 Violation Rises To The Level Of A Constitutional
Violation, The Plea May Be Withdrawn Whether The Case Is A Direct
Appeal Or Post Conviction Relief.
Petitioner next argues that the Court of Appeals was incorrect insofar as it relied
on rules arising from direct appeal cases. (Petitioner's Brief, p. 12). Contrary to
Petitioner's claim, these cases are not irrelevant. Id. Though some of the cases
referenced above involve direct appeals, and many reference habeas corpus petitions,
those relied on by Ms. Bluemel and the Court of Appeals discuss constitutional violations
that caused a defendant's plea to be unknowing and involuntary. Bluemel, 2006 UT App
141, HI 10-15, 134 P.3d 181 (citing Visser, 2000 UT 88 at 111, 22 P.3d 1242; Maguire,
830 P.2d at 217 (Utah 1991); Mora, 2003 UT App 117 at f 22, 69 P.3d 838; State v.
Stilling, 856 P.2d 666, 671 (Utah App. 1993); State v. Smith, 812 P.2d 470, 477 (Utah
App. 1991)). Because the issue here is a constitutional violation rather than a procedural
violation, all cases finding that a Rule 11 violation renders a plea unknowing or
involuntary are relevant.
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Petitioner argues that the "closest Bluemel comes to explaining its reasoning is a
passing reference to State v. Stilling" which states, "noncompliance with Rule 11
infringes on the constitutional rights of the accused." (Petitioner's Brief, p. 13). Stilling
draws upon the very different meaning between a technical violation and strict
compliance. Stilling should not be read as arguing that technical violations are
constitutional violations, or the same as failure to strictly comply. As stated above,
courts may commit technical violations of Rule 11 without affecting the validity of the
plea, but courts must strictly comply with Rule 11. Where noncompliance with Rule 11
is beyond technical and results in the purpose of Rule 11 being unfulfilled, a
constitutional violation results.
Again, the confusion stems from the differences in terminology. A clear
explanation of what amounts to a "technical violation," and what constitutes
"noncompliance" or "strict compliance" would greatly clarify the present state of Rule 11
jurisprudence. The type of violation in this case has consistently been held to be a failure
to strictly comply with Rule 11, and therefore a constitutional violation.
E. Bluemel Does Not Hold That Prejudice Is Presumed From Technical
Rule 11 Violations.
When a court fails to inform a defendant on the record of certain important
constitutional rights, such that there is no record establishing that the plea is voluntary,
prejudice is presumed. This rule is far different from a rule that "any technical
'noncompliance' with the prophylactic Rule 11 requirements infringes on the
constitutional rights of the accused,'" as Petitioner claims. (Petitioner's Brief, p. 14,
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quoting Bluemel, at ^ 17). While this was arguably the holding of State v. Dean, 2002
UT App 323, 57 P.3d 1106, and State v. Hittle, 2002 UT App 134, 47 P.3d 101, those
holdings have since been reversed. (Petitioner's Brief, p. 15). Bluemel was premised on
the more sensible holding in Mora.
Mora is far different from subsequently overturned cases that held technical
violations are constitutional violations. Significantly, when this Court overturned Dean
and Hittle, the Court did not overturn Mora. It appears that this court believed that there
was some significant difference between the Rule 11 violations in Dean and Hittle as
compared to Mora. When comparing those cases with this case, the Bluemel panel
correctly determined that Mora should govern.
Dean and Hittle were cases where a trial court informed a defendant of his right to
a jury trial, but used language slightly different from Rule 11, such as omitting the word
"speedy." By contrast, Mora involved a situation almost exactly like this one where the
trial court failed to incorporate the written plea statement, so the record did not
demonstrate that the defendant knew and understood his rights. There was no evidence
that the defendant actually read or understood the plea statement. While the language in
Mora is borrowed from Dean, Mora remains valid law while Dean does not. When this
Court reversed Dean, 2004 UT 63, 95 P.3d 276, the Court did not announce that
constitutional noncompliance with Rule 11 is only a technical violation, nor did it
overturn Mora. 2004 UT 63 If 17-18, 95 P.3d 276. It makes far more sense that this
Court reversed Dean because the error was technical and consisted of the omission of one
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word, rather than failure to inform a defendant of several important rights, as was the
case in Mora. Id.
It is still true that "Under Utah law [courts] will presume harm . . . when a trial
court fails to inform a defendant of his constitutional rights under Rule 11." Mora, 2003
UT App 117 at Tj 22, 69 P.3d 838. However, the above outlined distinctions between
technical violations and strict compliance make the rule more nuanced than Petitioner
asserts. The trial court did not inform Ms. Bluemel anywhere on the record of her right
to be presumed innocent, that the State carried the burden of proving her guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt, that her plea was an admission of all those elements, and that she had
the right to compel attendance of defense witnesses. Bluemel, 2006 UT App 141 at ^} 16,
134 P.3d 181. Bluemel correctly held that where such noncompliance renders the record
insufficient to conclude that the plea was voluntary, prejudice is presumed. Id. at f 1618.
Bluemel is much different from Dean and Hittle. Those cases held that a technical
violation is always sufficient to allow a defendant to withdraw her plea. Bluemel holds
that a defendant must be allowed to withdraw a guilty plea where the record does not
establish that the plea is knowing and voluntary.

II.

ALTERNATIVE GROUNDS EXIST FOR FINDING MS.
BLUEMEL'S PLEA WAS NOT KNOWING AND VOLUNTARY.

The Court granted certiorari to determine the standards for reviewing Rule 11
violations raised for the first time in a habeas petition. Even if the Court determines that
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the trial judge's noncompliance with Rule 11 and the incomplete record do not give rise
to a presumption that the plea was not knowing and voluntary, other circumstances
support a finding that Ms. BluemePs plea was not knowing and voluntary. The Court of
Appeals' opinion notes that other issues were raised, but the case was decided solely on
the Rule 11 issue. Bluemel, 2006 UT App 141 at \ 17, 134 P.3d 181. This section
discusses the factual issues surrounding the voluntariness of the plea. If the Court finds
for the State on the Rule 11 issue, it may alternatively find for Ms. Bluemel because the
effects of various prescription medications caused the plea to be unknowing and
involuntary. If the Court chooses not to address the factual issues at this time, this case
should be remanded for a determination on the voluntariness of that plea based on the
facts from this section. Ms. Bluemel would not be estopped from arguing that the Rule
11 violations in this case result in an unknowing and involuntary plea for other reasons as
outlined below. See e.g. State v. Robinson, 2006 UT 65 U 1, 2006 WL 3069523.
The Constitution requires that a guilty plea be knowingly and voluntarily entered.
State v. Benvenuto, 1999 UT 60,111, 983 P.2d 556; Stilling, 856 P.2d at 670-71. When
the plea is not knowingly and voluntarily entered, the defendant's due process rights have
been violated, and the plea is unconstitutional. Id:, McCarthy, 394 U.S. at 466. To enter
a knowing and voluntary plea, a defendant must be competent, which means the
defendant has "sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable
degree of rational understanding and has a rational as well as factual understanding of the
proceedings against him." State v. Holland, 921 P.2d 430, 433 (Utah 1996) (internal
quotations omitted) (quoting Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 396, 113 S.Ct. 2680, 2685
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(1993)). A plea is not knowing and voluntary if it is the product of ignorance,
incomprehension, coercion, terror, inducement, subtle or blatant threats, or if the
defendant is incompetent or otherwise not in control of [his] mental facilities."
Blankenship v. State, 858 S.W.2d 897, 904 (Tenn. 1993) (quoting Boykin, 395 U.S. at
242-43 and Brown v. PerinU 718 F.2d 784, 788 (6th Cir. 1983)). A defendant's
competency to enter a valid plea can be detrimentally affected by medications, which can
cause a defendant to be unable to enter a knowing and voluntary plea. Godinez, 509 U.S.
at 394 n.3, 396 n.6, 398-99.
Courts have oftentimes found a defendant incapable of entering a knowing and
voluntary plea when suffering from certain mental conditions or under the influence of
medication, alcohol, or drugs. In Holland, the defendant was found incompetent to enter
a plea when suffering from mental conditions, including depression. 921 P.2d at 434; see
also State v. Romers, 766 P.2d 623, 628 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988) (defendant incompetent to
enter knowing and voluntary plea when suffering from severe depression); Gomm, 754
P.2d 1226 (defendant's arguments that his plea was involuntary and unknowing because
he entered it while suffering from a mental illness, and while under the influence of
several prescription medications which he had taken in excess of their dosage, warranted
evidentiary hearing on the issue); Wells v. Shulsen, 747 P.2d 1043 (Utah 1987)
(evidentiary hearing warranted by defendant's arguments that his plea was involuntary
and unknowing because he was under the influence of medication when the plea was
entered). Because a defendant may be under the influence of something which affects his
ability to enter a knowing and voluntary plea, courts often directly ask the defendant or
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his counsel whether he is capable of entering a knowing and voluntary plea. State v.
Beckstead, 2004 UT App 338 at U 10, 100 P.3d 267 (court is not ordinarily required to
inquire beyond a defendant's denial of drug or alcohol use, but such a duty to make
additional inquiries may arise if the court becomes aware that the defendant may be
impaired); State v. Penman, 964 P.2d 1157 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (meaningful plea
colloquy when the trial court verified with the defendant that he could read, write, and
understand English, was not under the influence of drugs or alcohol, was not mentally ill,
understood the constitutional rights he was waiving by pleading guilty, understood the
penalties, and was satisfied with his attorney's advice.); State v. Cameron, 704 P.2d
1355, 1358 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985) (trial court could not judge a defendant's competency
to waive a jury based solely on the colloquy in which the defendant merely answered
"yes" or "no" to questions posed by the trial court); Holland, 921 P.2d at 435 (same).
In United States v. Damon, the defendant informed the trial court during the plea
colloquy that he was under the influence of prescription medication, but the trial court
failed to further question the defendant about the medication or its effects upon the
defendant. 191 F.3d 561 (4th Cir. 1999). Instead, the court accepted the guilty pleas, and
the defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court had a duty to "follow up on the drug
ingestion issue in order to determine whether he was competent to plead." Id. at 564.
The appeals court agreed, finding that the court should have broadened its inquiry to
satisfy itself that the plea was being made knowingly and voluntarily. Id. at 565. The
trial court erred in failing to conduct a further inquiry into the defendant's mental state as
a result of his medication use, and the case was remanded for a determination of whether
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the medication taken by the defendant, based on objective data about its nature and effect,
had the capability to sufficiently affect the defendant's mental faculties such to render
him incompetent to enter a guilty plea. Id. The trial court had a clear obligation to
ensure that a defendant's drug use did not effect his ability to enter a voluntary and
knowing plea. Id.; see also United States v. Cole, 813 F.2d 43, 46-47 (3rd Cir. 1987)
(where court is informed that the defendant has recently ingested drugs or other
substances capable of impairing his ability to make a knowing and voluntary waiver of
his constitutional rights, the state court has an obligation to inquire further into the
defendant's competence); United States v. Parra-Ibanez, 936 F.2d 588, 595-96 (1st Cir.
1991) (the court had reason to suspect that the medications taken by the accused might
impinge upon the defendant's capacity to enter a voluntary and intelligent plea, but failed
to inquire what dosages the defendant had taken and what effects, if any, the medications
would have on the defendant's clear-headedness); Godinez, 509 U.S. at 426-27
(Blackmun, J. Dissenting) (recognizing that medication can affect one's mental
competence and once trial court was aware of defendant's prescription drug use, it should
have conducted a further inquiry into his competence to waive his constitutional rights).
Conversely, in Benvenuto, the court found that a defendant had entered a knowing
and voluntary plea where, upon inquiry, both the defendant and his counsel informed the
court that there were no competency issues. 1999 UT 60 at ^ 11, 983 P.2d 556. There,
the defendant was charged with aggravated murder, attempted aggravated murder and
two counts of aggravated robbery, but was offered a plea in which the aggravated robbery
counts were dismissed. Id, Upon his arrest, he was placed on suicide watch at the county
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jail, and was appointed several attorneys who had extensive experience representing
clients who had mental health problems or whose competence to enter a plea was
questionable. Id. at ][ 3-4. Defense counsel inquired into defendant's competence and the
defendant was interviewed and examined by a forensic psychologist. Id. at f 5. These
examiners found the defendant to be depressed, but capable of entering a knowing and
voluntary plea. Id. At the plea hearing, the court conducted a Rule 11 colloquy, and
asked defense counsel if defendant was offering a voluntary and knowing plea. Id.
Defense counsel disclosed that the defendant had some mental health issues, but was an
intelligent young man and was capable of understanding the proceedings. Id. The court
then asked the defendant if he was being treated for any medical or mental conditions, to
which the defendant answered he was not. Id. at Tf 8. The defendant later moved to
withdraw his plea on the grounds that he was confused and depressed when he entered it,
and therefore that the plea was not truly voluntary. Id. at \ 9, 12. The trial court denied
the motion and the defendant appealed. Id. at f 9. On review the Utah Supreme Court
affirmed the district court's rulings, finding that the defendant's attorneys had been
"scrupulously attentive to [his] mental condition" and had reasonably inquired into his
mental state by having him examined by mental health professionals and conveyed their
knowledge of his competency at the hearing. Id. at ^f 14, 19-20. Further, the defendant's
own actions, demeanor, and statements at the plea supported finding of a voluntary plea.
Id. at \ 21. The Supreme Court then affirmed the trial court ruling, holding that the plea
was entered knowingly and voluntarily. Id. at ^| 23.

20

Similarly, in State v. Manning, the defendant petitioned for post-conviction relief,
claiming her right to appeal had been denied. 2004 UT App 87, 89 P.3d 196, affirmed on
other grounds, 2005 UT 61, 122 P.3d 628. In reviewing her claim, the court found at the
plea hearing the defendant entered knowing and voluntary pleas and knowingly and
voluntarily waived her rights, referencing defense counsel's assertions that defendant was
a "bright lady" who was educated through the 15 grade, and that she had participated in
preparing her written plea statement. Id. at ^f 4. Further, the defendant spoke directly to
the court, stating that defense counsel had adequately and properly served her, and she
was satisfied with his service. Id. Because the defendant was adequately informed of her
rights, and it was later shown that she did not request that an appeal be filed, her petition
was denied. Id. at ^f 29, 33-35.
In this case, unlike the defendants in Manning and Benvenuto, Ms. Bluemel was
not capable of entering knowing and voluntary pleas because of her medicated and
impaired mental state at the plea hearing. At the time she entered her plea, she was under
a doctor's care and was taking the following prescription medications for a litany of
maladies:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

600 mg of Neurotin three times daily (1800 mg per day)
150 mg of Effexor twice daily (300 mg per day)
5 mg Xanax daily
50 mg Trazadone daily
700 mg of Soma four times daily (2800 mg daily)
800 mg of Ibuprofen three times daily (2400 mg daily)
Macrodantin; and
Axid

21

(Civil R. 113-114, 121). The purpose of these medications was as follows: Neurotin for
mood stabilization, Effexor for depression, Xanax for panic attacks, Trazadone as a
sleeping aid, Ibuprofen for menstrual cramping, Macodantin for post-intercourse pain and
to prevent urinary tract infections, Axid for ulcers and heartburn, and Soma for muscle
tension and migraine prevention. (Civil R. 113). As testified to in the affidavit of
pharmacology and toxicology professor Doug E. Rollins, this culmination of medications
at the indicated dosages would likely cause a significant decrease in Ms. Bluemel's
cognitive functioning, and her cognitive abilities would be significantly impaired. (Civil
R. 109-110). This combination of medications severely limited Appellee's ability to
consult with her trial counsel with a reasonable degree of rational understanding, and to
understand the proceedings, and thus rendered her unable to enter and knowing and
voluntary plea.
Further, the court did nothing to discern whether Ms. Bluemel was able to enter a
knowing and voluntary plea. Beyond the omissions in the Rule 11 plea colloquy, the trial
court never inquired from either Ms. Bluemel or trial counsel as to whether Ms. Bluemel
was under the influence of anything, had any mental or emotional conditions affecting
her mental capacity, or was capable of entering a knowing and voluntary plea. Unlike the
trial courts in Beckstead and Penman who undertook to adequately ensure that the
defendant could enter a knowing and voluntary plea, this trial court did nothing of the
sort. Rather, like the trial courts in Holland and Cameron that were reversed and
remanded, the trial court attempted to judge the defendant's competency and ability to
enter a valid plea based merely on a few yes or no questions. The trial court's failure to
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inquire left hidden that Ms. Bluemel was under the influence of multiple prescription
medications that adversely impaired her mental state and made her unable to enter a
knowing and voluntary plea. Undoubtedly, had Judge Burningham been warned that Ms.
Bluemel was on eight prescription medications at the time, including psychotropic mood
stabilizing drugs, he would not have accepted her plea without further inquiry. See
Benvenuto, 1999 UT 60, 983 P.2d 556.
Additionally, the review of the video shows that Ms. Bluemel did not appear
capable of entering a knowing and voluntary plea. During the entire proceeding, she is
distracted and fidgety. (Civil R. 146). She repeatedly shifts her gaze around the
courtroom and does not focus solely on the judge. Id. Her demeanor is clearly
inconsistent with that of a defendant who is entering a plea to three first degree felony
charges with minimum mandatory sentences. The amount of medication she was under,
the trial court's failure to inquire of her mental capacity, and Ms. Bluemel's demeanor
during the hearing, all evince that she was unable to enter a knowing and voluntary plea.
Nothing to the contrary appears.
Ms. Bluemel's multiple prescription medications significantly affected her
cognitive abilities. Because the court did not ensure that appellant was able to enter a
knowing and voluntary plea, the plea was taken in violation of the Constitution. Under
such circumstances, the interests of justice outweigh the untimely filing of Respondent's
petition. The State's petition should be denied.
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III.

WHERE MS. BLUEMEL'S PLEA WAS UNKNOWING AND
INVOLUNTARY, THIS CLAIM IS NOT TIME BARRED.

Under the Post Conviction Remedies Act, a defendant may petition for postconviction relief, such as a vacation or modification of an original conviction or sentence,
on such grounds that "the conviction was obtained . . . in violation of the United States
Constitution . . . [or] the Utah Constitution . . . [or] the petitioner had ineffective
assistance of counsel in violation of the United States Constitution or Utah
Constitution^]" Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-104. The Act was meant to be a "substantive
legal remedy for any person who challenges a conviction or sentence for a criminal
offense and who has exhausted all other legal remedies[.]" Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a102. In assessing whether a final conviction would be reviewed, a judgment is usually
final and not subject to attack, except in unusual circumstances. Jackson v. Friel, 2004
UT App 155, 2004 WL 1368269 (unpublished decision) (citing Carter v. Galetka, 2001
UT 96, ^f 15, 44 P.3d 626). Unusual circumstances are demonstrated by showing that
"there was an obvious injustice or a substantial and prejudicial denial of a constitutional
right." Id. When an obvious injustice or denial of constitutional rights has occurred, a
post conviction petition may be used to attack the judgment of conviction. Gomm v.
Cook, 754 P.2d 1226, 1227 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
Pursuant to the statute, such a petition for post-conviction relief must be filed
within one year after the cause of action has accrued. Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-107. A
cause of action accrues on the latest of the following dates:
(a) the last day for filing an appeal from the entry of the final judgment of
conviction, if no appeal is taken;
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(b) the entry of the decision of the appellate court which has jurisdiction over the
case, if an appeal is taken;
(c) the last day for filing a petition for writ of certiorari in the Utah Supreme Court
or the United States Supreme Court, if no petition for writ of certiorari is filed;
(d) the entry of the denial of the petition for writ of certiorari or the entry of the
decision on the petition for certiorari review, if a petition for writ of certiorari
is filed; or
(e) the date on which petition knew or should have known, in the exercise of
reasonable diligence, of evidentiary facts on which the petition is based.
U.C.A. § 78-3 5a-107(2). However, an untimely filing may be excused if the court finds
that "the interests of justice require." U.C.A. § 78-35a-107(2). While Utah courts have
declined to provide a specific definition of "interests of justice," several cases have
addressed whether sufficient interests of justice require waiving an untimely filing.
In Julian v. State, an inmate filed for extraordinary relief pursuant to Rule 65B of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, alleging that the trial court erred in admitting hearsay
testimony without first assessing its reliability, and that both trial and appellate counsel
were ineffective. 966 P.2d 249 (Utah 1998). The State argued that the untimely filing
should bar review of the petition, and that the "interests of justice" exception was to be
applied narrowly in only truly exception circumstances. Id. at 254. The State further
argued that the statute of limitations under Section 78-35a-107 meant to encourage
litigants to research and bring their claims early to promote finality, and that the State had
an interest in keeping convicted persons incarcerated, and late claims made it "difficult, if
not impossible,... to defend against those claims." Id. While the Court appreciated the
State's arguments, it was not persuaded, stating that "if the proper showing is made [that
the petitioner has been wrongfully incarcerated], the mere passage of time can never
justify continued imprisonment of one who has been deprived of fundamental rights,
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regardless of how difficult it may be for the State to reprosecute that individual." Id.
(emphasis in original). The Court went on to say that "meritorious claims raised in a
habeas corpus petition will always be in the interests of justice." Id. The Court then
found that the trial court acted within its discretion in concluding that the interests of
justice—the gravity of petitioner's claims—excused his untimely filing. Id. at 258.
While this case dealt with a petition for habeas corpus, the Court specifically addressed
the one-year filing deadline in the Post Conviction Remedies Act.
Additionally, in Currier v. Holden, the Court excused an untimely filing where the
defendant was moved to a rural jail and had trouble meeting with attorneys. Currier v.
Holden, 862 P.2d 1357, 1359 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). In McClellan v. Holden, the court
excused an untimely filing where the defendant had two attorneys withdraw from his
case, had difficulty contacting a new attorney, and the trial transcript was misplaced. 862
P.2d 1357, 1359-60 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). Conversely, a five-year delay and lack of
evidence justifying a waiver did not excuse on untimely filing in Oliver v. State, 2004 UT
App 360 (unpublished decision). Also, the court found no reason to excuse the untimely
filing where a defendant dumped the facts of the case on the court with no research or
legal argument, Bairdv, Galetka, 2003 UT App 250 (unpublished decision), or where the
defendant's claims were frivolous and had already been raised and rejected. Reddish v.
Galteka, 2000 UT App 328 (unpublished decision).
In looking at the "interests of justice" exception to a time deadline, other states
have discussed several factors that may be considered in a court's decision. In State v.
Goodwin, the New Jersey Supreme Court was faced with the untimely filing of a petition
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for post-conviction relief 803 A.2d 102 (N.J. 2002). The New Jersey post-conviction
relief statute states that a "court may relax the time bar if the defendant alleges facts
demonstrating that the delay was due to the defendant's excusable neglect or if the
interests of justice' demand it." Id. at 109. There the Court stated that in determining
whether a defendant had put forth sufficient evidence to relax the time bar in the interests
of justice, the court should "consider the extent and cause of the delay, the prejudice to
the State, and the importance of the petitioner's claims[.]" Id. After applying these
factors however, the petition was found to be time-barred because the defendant failed to
adequately explain the nearly three-year delay. Id. at 113.
In this case, Ms. Bluemel readily admits that her Petition was untimely filed. She
was sentenced on March 27, 2002 and had thirty days to appeal or move to withdraw her
pleas, which deadline occurred on April 26, 2002. Although she repeatedly expressed the
desire to do so to her counsel, no such motion was made. Accordingly her cause of
action accrued April 26, 2002, and she had until April 26, 2003 to file a petition for postconviction relief. Her petition was not filed until May 3, 2004, one year and seven days
after the deadline. The cause for most of this delay was trial counsel's continued
misrepresentation to his client that he was taking care of her case, when in fact he was not
doing anything with the case. Once Ms. Bluemel finally realized she was not receiving
assistance, the deadline for filing her petition had passed. She then was faced with the
task of retaining new counsel while incarcerated, much like the defendant in McClellan.
It is notable that during this entire period, Ms. Bluemel was incarcerated at the Utah State
Prison. It goes without saying that an inmate's ability to locate, retain, and meet with
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counsel is significantly more difficult than one who is not incarcerated. While it is true
that Ms. Bluemel did not seek counsel for a time, this failure was based on her trial
counsel's repeated representations that he was actively working on her appeal. (Civil R.
112-13).
Additionally, any prejudice to the State is minimal, if present at all. The State
argued that "[cjollateral attacks on legitimate convictions many years later make it
difficult, if not impossible, for the State to defend against those claims. Witnesses may
have moved, died, or otherwise forgotten the events in question. Important evidence may
have also been destroyed." (Civil R. 78). Additionally, in its Order granting the State's
Motion to Dismiss, the trial court noted that the victim could be harmed by reopening the
case. (Civil R. 132). Specifically, the trial court noted that the "emotional trauma of the
crime can often be more significant than the physical impact" and that "[allowing a tardy
challenge which could result in the prosecution beginning anew can create tremendous
hardship and difficulty for all witnesses." (Civil R. 132).
Ms. Bluemel concedes that victims need not be drug through numerous court
proceedings if unnecessary, but also contends that granting the post conviction petition
will not further emotionally scar the victim. As the case ended in a plea the victim has
never testified. Further the victim was not a young child who could be traumatized
merely by new court proceedings, but rather a male adolescent who has now reached the
age of majority. (Crim. R. 57:4).
While the State does have a legitimate interest in limiting challenges to
convictions, this interest cannot and does not trump a defendant's interest in having his
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constitutional rights protected. The Utah Supreme Court has rejected this argument
outright. See Julian, 966 P.2d at 254. ("[T]he mere passage of time can never justify
continued imprisonment of one who has been deprived of fundamental rights, regardless
of how difficult it may be for the State to reprosecute the individual.") (emphasis in
original). Further the one-year delay in filing should not be prejudicial to the State
because the State should still have the file and any evidence, including statements from
the victim that prompted the plea initially, and no showing has been made that any
witnesses have died or moved, or that the events underscoring this case would easily be
forgotten. Thus, although the State would be forced to reprosecute the case, it is not
unduly prejudicial to require it to do such when constitional rights were clearly violated.
Under Goodwin, by entering an unknowing and involuntary plea, Ms. Bluemel has
received a substantial injustice, requiring a relaxing of the time requirements. Ms.
BluemePs plea was unknowing and involuntary, both because she was under the
influence of several mind-altering prescription medications and because the court failed
to establish that she understood the rights she waived by entering a guilty plea.

CONCLUSIONS
The trial court's failure to comply with Rule 11 renders the guilty plea unknowing
and involuntary. Though the Supreme Court may examine the entire record, nothing in
the trial record indicates that Ms. Bluemel understood all of the rights she was waiving.
Even if the record did contain sufficient facts to render the plea constitutional, Ms.
Bluemel was under the influence of several prescriptions and over the counter
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CONCLUSIONS
The trial court's failure to comply with Rule 11 renders the guilty plea unknowing
and involuntary. Though the Supreme Court may examine the entire record, nothing in
the trial record indicates that Ms. Bluemel understood all of the rights she was waiving.
Even if the record did contain sufficient facts to render the plea constitutional, Ms.
Bluemel was under the influence of several prescriptions and over the counter
medications that influenced her at the time of the guilty plea. Because of the combination
of these factors, the interests of justice require that Ms. Bluemel be permitted to withdraw
her plea even though her petition wasfiledafter the one year deadline.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 19th day of December, 2006.
SKORDAS, (ZWSTON & HYDE

Gregory C. Skordas
RefaXca C.Hyde
Attorneys for Defendant
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Bluemel v. StateUtah App.,2006.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
Tammy BLUEMEL, Petitioner and Appellant,
v.
STATE of Utah, Respondent and Appellee.
No. 20050208-CA.
April 13,2006.
Rehearing Denied May 25, 2006.
Background: Following her convictions on her pleas of guilty to three counts of rape and supplying alcohol to a minor,
defendant filed petition for post-conviction relief. State filed motion to dismiss petition because it was untimely filed.
The District Court, Provo Department, James R. Taylor. J., dismissed petition. Defendant appealed.
Holdings: The Court of Appeals, Russel W. Bench, P.J., held that:
(1) trial court, in conducting plea colloquy with defendant, erred in failing to comply with rule governing taking of
pleas, and
£2} defendant's failure to timely file her petition for post-conviction relief fell within interests-of-justice exception under
Post-Conviction Remedies Act (PCRA).

Reversed and remanded.
West Headnotes
i l l Criminal Law 110 €=^1134(10)
110 Criminal Law
110XXIV Review
HOXXlVfL) Scope of Review in General
110k! 134 Scope and Extent in General
HOkl 134(10) k. Interlocutory, Collateral, and Supplementary Proceedings and Questions. Most Cited Cases
Dismissal of a petition for post-conviction relief is reviewed for correctness without deference to the trial court's
conclusions of law.
121 Criminal Law 110 €^>273.1(1)
110 Criminal Law
110XV Pleas
ii0k272 Plea of Guilty
110k273.1 Voluntary Character
110k273.im k. In General. Most Cited Cases
The plea-taking proceedings set forth in ruling governing pleas are intended to insure that a defendant who pleads guilty
knowingly and voluntarily waives the protections the constitution guarantees him prior to a trial verdict. Rules
Crim.Proc. Rule 11.
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131 Constitutional Law 92 €^>265.5
92 Constitutional Law
92X11 Due Process of Law
92k256 Criminal Prosecutions
92k265.5 k. Arraignment and Plea. Most Cited Cases
A guilty plea must be knowingly and voluntarily made in order to protect a defendant's due process rights. U.S.C.A.
Const.Amend. 14; Rules Crim.Proc. Rule 11.
HI Criminal Law 110 €^>H63(1)
110 Criminal Law
110XX1V Review
HOXXIV(O) Harmless and Reversible Error
110k! 163 Presumption as to Effect of Error
110kll63m k. In General. Most Cited Cases
Appellate court will presume harm when a trial court fails to inform a defendant of his constitutional rights under rule
governing pleas, because, by not knowing which rights defendant is waiving, defendant cannot make a fully informed
decision. Rules Crim.Proc. Rule 11.
151 Criminal Law 110 e^>273.1(4)
110 Criminal Law
110XV Pleas
H0k272 Plea of Guilty
110k273.1 Voluntary Character
110k273.1(4) k. Ascertainment by Court; Advising and Informing Accused. Most Cited Cases
If defendant is not fully informed of his rights prior to pleading guilty, then the guilty plea cannot be voluntary. Rules
Crim.Proc. Rule 11.
161 Criminal Law 110 €^>273.1(1)
110 Criminal Law
110XV Pleas
JJ0k272 Plea of Guilty
110k273.1 Voluntary Character
110k273.im k. In General. Most Cited Cases
A court cannot accept an involuntary guilty plea and still claim to have done justice. Rules Crim.Proc, Rule 11.
121 Criminal Law 110 €=^273.1(4)
110 Criminal Law
110XV Pleas
U0k272 Plea of Guilty
110k273.1 Voluntary Character
110k273.K4) k. Ascertainment by Court; Advising and Informing Accused. Most Cited Cases
Trial court bears the burden of ensuring strict compliance with rule governing the taking of pleas; this means that the
trial court must personally establish that defendant's guilty plea is truly knowing and voluntary and establish on the
record that defendant knowingly waived his or her constitutional rights. Rules Crim.Proc. Rule 11.
181 Criminal Law 110 €^273.1(4)

veb2.westlaw.com/print/printstream.aspx?destination=atp&s...r=2.0&prid=A0055800000059470005501443BFE05758E27F9044&rs=WLW6.11

Page 2 of 7

110 Criminal Law
110XV Pleas
JL10k272 Plea of Guilty
110k273.1 Voluntary Character
110k273.1(4) k. Ascertainment by Court; Advising and Informing Accused. Most Cited Cases
Although the trial court has a duty of strict compliance with rule governing the taking of pleas, strict compliance does
not mandate a particular script or rote recitation of the rights listed. Rules Crim.Proc Rule 11.
121 Criminal Law 110 €^273.1(4)
110 Criminal Law
110XV Pleas
110k272 Plea of Guilty
110k273.1 Voluntary Character
110k273.1(4) k. Ascertainment by Court; Advising and Informing Accused. Most Cited Cases
A plea statement from defendant is used to promote efficiency during a plea colloquy; however, a plea statement should
be only the starting point, not an end point, in the pleading process. Rules Crim.Proc. Rule 11(e).
U0| Criminal Law 110 €^273.1(4)
110 Criminal Law
110XV Pleas
H0k272 Plea of Guilty
110k273.1 Voluntary Character
110k273.U4) k. Ascertainment by Court; Advising and Informing Accused. Most Cited Cases
It is critical that strict compliance with rule governing taking of pleas be demonstrated on the record at the time the
guilty plea is entered; therefore, if a plea statement is used to aid compliance with the rule, it must be addressed during
the plea hearing. Rules Crim.Proc. Rule 11(e).
fill Criminal Law 110 €^>273.1(4)
110 Criminal Law
110XV Pleas
Ji0k272 Plea of Guilty
110k273.1 Voluntary Character
110k273.1(4) k. Ascertainment by Court; Advising and Informing Accused. Most Cited Cases
Trial court must conduct an inquiry to establish that defendant understands a plea statement and voluntarily signed it, at
which time, omissions or ambiguities in the statement must be clarified during the plea hearing, as must any
uncertainties raised in the course of the plea colloquy; thus, the efficiency-promoting function of the plea statement is
thereby served, in that the trial court need not repeat, verbatim, inquiries required by rule governing taking of pleas that
are clearly posed and answered in the statement, unless the rule, by its terms, specifically requires such repetition. Rules
Crim.Proc. Rule 11(e).
I12| Criminal Law 110 €^273.1(4)
110 Criminal Law
110XV Pleas
110k272 Plea of Guilty
110k273.1 Voluntary Character
110k273.1f4) k. Ascertainment by Court; Advising and Informing Accused. Most Cited Cases
Trial court failed to properly incorporate defendant's plea statement into record, given that, during plea colloquy
concerning the statement, trial court asked defendant only if she had "any questions about the statement," but trial court
did not ask defendant if she actually read, understood, and acknowledged her plea statement, or make any other similar
//web2.westlawxom/print/printstream.aspx?destination=atp&^^
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inquiry. Rules Crim.Proc.. Rule 11(e).
U31 Criminal Law 110 €^1128(1)
110 Criminal Law
110XXIV Review
llOXXIV(G) Record and Proceedings Not in Record
110XXIV(G)16 Matters Not Apparent of Record
110kll28 In General
110kll28(l) k. In General. Most Cited Cases
Trial court's critical error in failing to properly incorporate defendant's written plea statement into record precluded
appellate court from considering plea statement in determining whether record established that trial court strictly
complied with rule governing taking of pleas. Rules Crim.Proc.. Rule 11(e).
[141 Criminal Law 110 €==>273.1(4)
110 Criminal Law
110XV Pleas
ii0k272 Plea of Guilty
110k273.1 Voluntary Character
110k273.1(4) k. Ascertainment by Court; Advising and Informing Accused. Most Cited Cases
Trial court, in conducting plea colloquy with defendant, erred in failing to comply with rule governing taking of pleas;
trial court failed to inform defendant of her right to presumption of innocence, that state carried burden of proving her
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, that her plea was an admission of all those elements, and that she had right to compel
attendance of defense witnesses. Rules Crim.Proc. Rule 11(e)(3). (e)(4)(A).
1151 Criminal Law 110 €=^1586
110 Criminal Law
110XXX Post-Conviction Relief
HOXXX(C) Proceedings
110XXX(C)1 In General
110kl586 k. Time for Proceedings. Most Cited Cases
Trial court's error in failing to comply with rule governing taking of pleas infringed on defendant's constitutional rights,
such that her failure to timely file her petition for post-conviction relief fell within interests-of-justice exception under
Post-Conviction Remedies Act (PCRA). West's U.C A. S 78-35a-107(3): Rules Crim.Proc . Rule 11(e).
*183 Jack M. Morgan and Benjamin A. Hamilton. Skordas Caston & Morgan, Salt Lake City, for Appellant.
Mark L. Shurtleff. Atty. Gen., and Brett J. DelPorto. Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City, for Appellee.
Before BENCH. P.J., McHUGH and ORME. JJ.
OPINION
BENCH. Presiding Judge:
K 1 Tammy Bluemel appeals the dismissal of her petition for post-conviction relief. The trial court concluded that the
petition was untimely filed and did not constitute an interests-of-justice exception under the Post-Conviction Remedies
Act (PCRA). See Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-107 (Supp.2005). We reverse and remand for further proceedings.

BACKGROUND
f 2 Between October 1998 and April 1999, Bluemel allegedly engaged in sexual intercourse with her fourteen-year-old
foster son on several occasions and, in one instance, gave him alcohol. Bluemel was charged with seven counts of rape,
all first degree felonies, see Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-402 (2003). and one count of supplying alcohol to a minor, a class
veb2 westlaw com/print/pnntstream aspx?destmation=atp&s
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A misdemeanor, see Utah Code Ann. § 32A-12-203 (2003).
\ 3 With the assistance of her trial counsel, Bluemel negotiated a plea agreement, which was reduced to writing as a plea
statement. The plea statement indicated that Bluemel agreed to plead guilty to three counts of rape and one count of
supplying alcohol to a minor, while the State agreed to dismiss the other four counts of rape. The plea statement
referenced the consequences of entering a guilty plea and discussed basic constitutional rights, such as the right to a jury
trial, the right to presumption of innocence, and the State's burden of proof. The plea statement also declared that
Bluemel waived these constitutional rights and that she voluntarily entered her pleas. Further, the plea statement
indicated that Bluemel read and understood the plea statement, that she *184 was "not under the influence of any drugs,
medication, or intoxicants," and that she "knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily enter[ed]" her pleas.
Tf 4 During her arraignment, the trial court E^l informed Bluemel that "[bjefore I can accept your pleas, you have certain
[constitutional [r]ights that you need to waive. They are talked about in that statement in advance of plea. Do you have
any questions about the statement?" Bluemel indicated that she did not have any questions about the plea statement. The
trial court went on to ask Bluemel if she understood her constitutional rights and that she would be waiving them.
Bluemel responded affirmatively. The trial court then informed Bluemel "that if you wish to withdraw these pleas you
need to make a motion in writing to do that within [thirty] days of sentencing" and that the court "would not
automatically grant that motion." Bluemel acknowledged that she understood. The trial court then stated, "[s]o if you do
intend to plea, then let's have you sign the [plea] statement." Bluemel, her attorney, the prosecutor, and the trial judge all
signed the plea statement. Bluemel then verbally entered on the record her guilty pleas to three counts of rape and one
count of supplying alcohol to a minor. The trial court accepted the pleas and found that "Bluemel ha[d] knowingly and
voluntarily entered her pleas."
FN1. Judge Guy R. Burningham, who has since retired, presided over Bluemel's arraignment in 2001. Later, in
2005, Judge James R. Taylor presided over and dismissed Bluemel's petition for post-conviction relief. For
ease of reference, we refer to both judges as "the trial court."
If 5 On March 27, 2002, Bluemel was sentenced to three indeterminate terms of not less than five years to life and one
indeterminate term not to exceed one year, all of which would run concurrently. Bluemel was immediately taken into
custody and remains incarcerated.
K 6 Immediately following her sentencing, Bluemel allegedly informed her trial counsel that she wanted to appeal. Her
trial counsel allegedly advised Bluemel that he would handle her appeal and informed her that she had one year to file
her appeal. During her first year in prison, her trial counsel allegedly visited her three times and continually informed her
that he was still working on her appeal. Bluemel later attempted to contact her trial counsel concerning the status of her
appeal, but he refused to respond to her communications. After one year, Bluemel sought other legal counsel and hired
her current counsel in October 2003. After meeting with Bluemel and reviewing the matter, her current counsel filed the
petition on May 3, 2004, over two years after her sentencing date. The State moved for dismissal of the petition because
it was untimely and did not qualify under the interests-of-justice exception. The trial court dismissed Bluemel's petition
and now she appeals the dismissal.
ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
£11 % 7 Bluemel argues that the trial court erred in dismissing her petition for post-conviction relief as untimely because
her circumstances come within the interests-of-justice exception under the PCRA. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-107.
Bluemel asserts that she did not enter knowing and voluntary pleas and received ineffective assistance of counsel, either
of which warrants post-conviction relief. Dismissal of a petition for post-conviction relief is reviewed " 'for correctness
without deference to the [trial] court's conclusions of law.' " Gardner v. Galetka. 2004 UT 42.H 7. 94 P.3d 263 (quoting
Rudolph v. Galetka. 2002 UT 7.114. 43 P.3d 467).
ANALYSIS
f 8 "[T]he legislature enacted the PCRA to 'establishf ] a substantive legal remedy for any person who challenges a
//wpb2.westIawxom/pnnt/printstream.aspx?destination=atp&s..T=2.0&prid=A0055800000059470005501443BFE05758E27F9044&rs=WLW6.11
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conviction or sentence for a criminal offense.' " Id at If 9 (second alteration in original) (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 7835a-102(1) (2002)). Under the PCRA, a person may file a petition for post-conviction relief within one year after "the
last day for filing an appeal from the entry of thefinaljudgment of conviction, if no appeal is taken." Utah Code Ann. §
78-35a-107(2)(a). However, an untimely filing may be excused "[i]f the court finds that the *185 interests of justice [so]
require." Id § 78-35a-107(3).
U 9 Bluemel argues that her circumstances in this matter fit within the PCRA's interests-of-justice exception, and that
her petition should not have been dismissed. Bluemel claims the exception should be recognized here because (1) she
did not enter knowing and voluntary pleas and (2) she received ineffective assistance of counsel throughout the course of
the trial court proceedings. In support of her claim that she did not enter knowing and voluntary pleas, Bluemel argues
that the trial court failed to strictly comply with rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. See Utah R Crim. P.
JJFN2
FN2. Because our decision that the trial court did not strictly comply with rule 11 by failing to inform Bluemel
of certain constitutional rights is dispositive, we need not address her claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
nor Bluemel's argument concerning the influence of prescription medications, which allegedly prevented her
from sufficiently understanding her plea.
I21I3JI41I5JI6] K 10 "The procedures for entering a guilty plea are set forth in rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure." State v Benvenuto. 1999 UT 60^ 11. 983 P.2d 556: see also Utah R.Crim. P. 11. "The plea-taking
proceedings [in rule 111 are intended to insure that a defendant who pleads guilty knowingly and voluntarily waives the
protections the constitution guarantees him or her prior to a trial verdict." State v Stilling. 856 P.2d 666. 671 (Utah
Ct.App.1993). "A guilty plea must be knowingly and voluntarily made in order to protect a defendant's due process
rights." Id_ "It is well established under Utah law that we will presume harm ... when a trial court fails to inform a
defendant of his constitutional rights under rule 11." State v Mora. 2003 UT App 117.H 22. 69 P.3d 838 (omission in
original) (citation and quotations omitted). "We presume harm because, by not knowing which rights a defendant is
waiving, the defendant cannot make a fully informed decision." Id_ (citation and quotations omitted). "If the defendant
is not fully informed of his rights prior to pleading guilty, then the guilty plea cannot be voluntary. We cannot accept an
involuntary guilty plea and still claim to have done justice." ld_ (citation and quotations omitted).
I21IS1 11 11 Under Utah law, the trial court bears the burden of ensuring strict compliance with rule 11. See State v
Gibbons. 740 P.2d 1309. 1312-13 (Utah 1987). appeal after remand on other grounds, 779 P 2d 1133 (Utah 1989).
"This means 'that the trial court [must] personally establish that the defendant's guilty plea is truly knowing and
voluntary and establish on the record that the defendant knowingly waived his or her constitutional rights.' " State v
Visser. 2000 UT 88.1f 11. 22 P 3d 1242 (alteration in original) (quoting State v Abevta. 852 P.2d 993. 995 (Utah 1993)).
Although the trial court has "a duty of 'strict' compliance" with rule 11. strict compliance "does not mandate a particular
script or rote recitation of the rights listed." ld_ In Visser. the Utah Supreme Court "reemphasize [d] that the substantive
goal of rule 11 is to ensure that defendants know of their rights and thereby understand the basic consequences of their
decision to plead guilty. That goal should not be overshadowed or undermined by formalistic ritual." IcL
K 12 Rule 11(e) identifies specific rights and factors of which the trial court must inform the defendant. .See Utah
RCrim P. 11(e). These include, among other things, that the plea is voluntary, the right to presumption of innocence,
the right to counsel, the right against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to a speedy trial before a jury, the right to
confront and cross-examine witnesses, and that the defendant waives these rights. See id Rule 11(e) also requires that
the "defendant understand[ ] the nature and elements of the offense to which the plea is entered, that upon trial the
prosecution would have the burden of proving each of those elements beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the plea is an
admission of all those elements." Id
[91 [ 10] f 13 In determining whether a defendant is informed of his or her rights, properly understands them, and
voluntarily waives them, the trial court must engage in a plea colloquy with the defendant. See id Rule 11 provides two
avenues whereby the trial court may properly engage in a plea colloquy. The trial court may (1) verbally *186 question
the defendant on the record regarding each of the factors and rights described in rule 11(e) or (2) receive a written plea
statement from the defendant regarding each of the rights and factors. See id The plea statement is "used to promote
/veb2 westlaw com/pnnt/pnntstream aspx?destmation=atp&s
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efficiency during a plea colloquy." Mora. 2003 UT App 117 at f 19. 69 P.3d 838. "However, [a plea statement] should
be only the starting point, not an end point, in the pleading process." IcL (citation and quotations omitted). "It is critical
... that strict [r]ule 11 compliance be demonstrated on the record at the time the guilty ... plea is entered. Therefore, if [a
plea statement] is used to aid [r]ule 11 compliance, it must be addressed during the plea hearing." A£ (first omission,
and first and third alterations in original) (citations and quotations omitted).
[Ill U 14 "The trial court must conduct an inquiry to establish that the defendant understands the [plea statement] and
voluntarily signed it." Id_ (citation and quotations omitted); see also State v. Maguire. 830 P.2d 216. 217 (Utah 1991)
(holding a plea statement is "properly incorporated in the record" when "the trial judge ascertains in the plea colloquy
that the defendant has read, has understood, and acknowledges all the information contained therein"), appeal after
remand, 924 P.2d 904 (Utah Ct.App.1996). rev'd on other grounds, 957 P.2d 598 (Utah 1998). At that time, "omissions
or ambiguities in the [statement] must be clarified during the plea hearing, as must any uncertainties raised in the course
of the plea colloquy." State v. Smith 812 P.2d 470, 477 (Utah Ct.App. 1991). Thus, "the efficiency-promoting function
of the [plea statement] is thereby served, in that the court need not repeat, verbatim, rule 11 inquiries that are clearly
posed and answered in the [statement], unless rule 11 by its terms specifically requires such repetition." Id.
[121[13"| % 15 In this case, the plea statement was not properly incorporated into the record. During the plea colloquy
concerning her statement, the trial court asked Bluemel only if she had "any questions about the statement." Bluemel
responded that she did not and was directed by the trial court to sign the statement. However, the trial court never asked
Bluemel if she actually read, understood, and acknowledged her plea statement. See Maguire. 830 P.2d at 217. Nor did
the trial court make any other similar inquiry. We conclude that this was a critical error. As a result, "the [statement]
was hot properly incorporated into the record, and we may not consider it when determining whether the record
establishes that the trial court strictly complied with rule 11." State v. Mora. 2003 UT App 117^ 20. 69 P.3d 838.
[141 TI 16 In reviewing the plea colloquy (exclusive of the plea statement) in this matter, the trial court failed to inform
Bluemel of all of the rule 11(e) factors and rights. See Utah R.Crim. P. 11 (e). Specifically, the trial court failed to inform
Bluemel of her "right to the presumption of innocence," that the State carried the burden of proving her guilty "beyond a
reasonable doubt," that her "plea is an admission of all those elements," and that she had the "right to compel the
attendance of defense witnesses." Utah R.Crim. P. 11(e)(3). (4VA). As a result, the trial court erred by not fully
complying with rule 11 in this matter.
[15] K 17 Additionally, because noncompliance with rule 11 infringes on the constitutional rights of the accused, see
State v. Stilling. 856 P.2d 666. 671 (Utah Ct.App. 1993), we conclude that noncompliance with rule 11 readily falls
within the interests-of-justice exception under the PCRA, see Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-107(3). As a result, the trial
court erred by dismissing Bluemel's petition for post-conviction relief.
CONCLUSION
f 18 We conclude that the plea statement was not properly incorporated into the record and that the trial court did not
sufficiently conduct a rule 11 colloquy with Bluemel. As a result, Bluemel's circumstances qualified under the interestsof-justice exception to the PCRA and the trial court erred by dismissing her petition. We therefore reverse and remand
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
*187 f 19 WE CONCUR: CAROLYN B. McHUGH and GREGORY K. ORME. Judges.
Utah App.,2006.
Bluemel v. State
134 P.3d 181,549 Utah Adv. Rep. 32, 2006 UT App 141
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Addendum B

U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. Vl-Jury Trials
UNITED STATES CODE ANNOTATED
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
ANNOTATED
AMENDMENT VI-JURY TRIAL FOR CRIMES, AND PROCEDURAL RIGHTS
-•Amendment VI. Jury trials for crimes, and procedural rights
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the
State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by
law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to
have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.
Current through P.L. 109-394 (excluding P.L. 109-390)-approved 12-14-06
Copr. © 2006 Thomson/West. No. Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works
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UT CONST Art. 1, § 12
U.C.A. 1953, Const. Art. 1, § 12
WEST'S UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH
ARTICLE I. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS
-•Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons]
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and defend
in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the accusation
against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be
confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to compel
the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public trial by
an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is alleged to
have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases.
In no instance
shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to advance money
or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed.
The accused shall not be
compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to
testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any
person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary examination, the
function of that examination is limited to determining whether probable cause
exists unless otherwise provided by statute.
Nothing in this constitution
shall preclude the use of reliable hearsay evidence as defined by statute or
rule in whole or in part at any preliminary examination to determine probable
cause or at any pretrial proceeding with respect to release of the defendant if
appropriate discovery is allowed as defined by statute or rule.
Statutes and Constitution are current through end of 2006 legislation
Copr © 2006 Thomson/West
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UT ST § 78-2a-3
U.C.A. 1953 § 78-2a-3
WEST'S UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
TITLE 78. JUDICIAL CODE
PART I. COURTS
CHAPTER 2A. COURT OF APPEALS
-•§ 78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs and
to issue all writs and process necessary:
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and decrees; or
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction.
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of
interlocutory appeals, over:
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative
proceedings of state agencies or appeals from the district court review of
informal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, except the Public Service
Commission, State Tax Commission, School and Institutional Trust Lands Board
of Trustees, Division of Forestry, Fire and State Lands actions reviewed by
the executive director of the Department of Natural Resources, Board of Oil,
Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer;
(b) appeals from the district court review of:
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political subdivisions of the
state or other local agencies; and
(ii) a challenge to agency action under Section 63-46a-12.1:
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts;
(d) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in criminal cases, except
those involving a charge of a first degree or capital felony;
(e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those involving
a conviction or charge of a first degree felony or capital felony;
(f) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs sought by
persons who are incarcerated or serving any other criminal sentence, except
petitions constituting a challenge to a conviction of or the sentence for a
first degree or capital felony;
(g) appeals from the orders on petitions for extraordinary writs challenging
the decisions of the Board of Pardons and Parole except in cases involving a
first degree or capital felony;
(h) appeals
from district court
involving domestic
relations cases,
including, but not limited to, divorce, annulment, property division, child
web2.westlawxom/print/printstream.asDX?desti^

"

p

custody, support, parent-time, visitation, adoption, and paternity;
(i) appeals from the Utah Military Court;

and

(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court.
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only and by the vote of four
judges of the court may certify to the Supreme Court for original appellate
review and determination any matter over which the Court of Appeals has
original appellate jurisdiction.
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the requirements of Title 63,
Chapter
46b, Administrative
Procedures Act, in its review of agency
adjudicative proceedings.
Statutes and Constitution are current through end of 2006 legislation
Copr © 2006 Thomson/West
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U.C.A. 1953 § 78-35a-102
WEST'S UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
TITLE 78. JUDICIAL CODE
PART IV. PARTICULAR PROCEEDINGS
CHAPTER 35A. POST-CONVICTION REMEDIES ACT
PART 1. GENERAL PROVISIONS
-4§ 78-35a-102. Replacement of prior remedies
(1) This chapter establishes a substantive legal remedy for any person who
challenges a conviction or sentence for a criminal offense and who has
exhausted all other legal remedies, including a direct appeal except as
provided in Subsection (2). Procedural provisions for filing and commencement
of a petition are found in Rule 65C, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
(2) This chapter does not apply to:
(a) habeas corpus petitions that do not challenge a conviction or sentence
for a criminal offense;
(b) motions to correct
Criminal Procedure; or

a sentence pursuant to Rule

22(e), Utah Rules of

(c) actions taken by the Board of Pardons and Parole.
Statutes and Constitution are current through end of 2006 legislation
Copr © 2006 Thomson/West
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U.C.A. 1953 § 78-35a-104
WEST'S UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
TITLE 78. JUDICIAL CODE
PART IV. PARTICULAR PROCEEDINGS
CHAPTER 35A. POST-CONVICTION REMEDIES ACT
PART 1. GENERAL PROVISIONS
-•§ 78-35a-104. Grounds for relief—Retroactivity of rule
(1) Unless precluded by Section 78-35a-106 or 78-35a-107, a person who has been
convicted and sentenced for a criminal offense may file an action in the
district court of original jurisdiction for post-conviction relief to vacate or
modify the conviction or sentence upon the following grounds:
(a) the conviction was obtained or the sentence was imposed in violation of
the United States Constitution or Utah Constitution;
(b) the conviction was obtained under a statute that is in violation of the
United States Constitution or Utah Constitution, or the conduct for which the
petitioner was prosecuted is constitutionally protected;
(c) the sentence was imposed in an unlawful manner, or probation was revoked
in an unlawful manner;
(d) the petitioner had ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the
United States Constitution or Utah Constitution; or
(e) newly discovered material evidence exists that requires the court to
vacate the conviction or sentence, because:
(i) neither the petitioner nor petitioner's counsel knew of the evidence at
the time of trial or sentencing or in time to include the evidence in any
previously filed post-trial motion or post-conviction proceeding, and the
evidence could not have been discovered through the exercise of reasonable
diligence;
(ii) the material evidence is not merely cumulative of evidence that was
known;
(iii) the material evidence is not merely impeachment evidence;

and

(iv) viewed with all the other evidence, the newly discovered material
evidence demonstrates that no reasonable trier of fact could have found the
petitioner guilty of the offense or subject to the sentence received.
(2) The question
announced by the
of Appeals after
applicable state

of whether a petitioner is entitled to the benefit of a rule
United States Supreme Court, Utah Supreme Court, or Utah Court
the petitioner's conviction became final shall be governed by
and federal principles of retroactivity.

Statutes and Constitution are current through end of 2006 legislation
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V\fesfckw
U.C.A. 1953 § 78-35a-107
WEST'S UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
TITLE 78. JUDICIAL CODE
PART IV. PARTICULAR PROCEEDINGS
CHAPTER 35A. POST-CONVICTION REMEDIES ACT
PART 1. GENERAL PROVISIONS
•+§ 78-35a-107. Statute of limitations for postconviction relief
(1) A petitioner is entitled to relief only if the petition is filed within one
year after the cause of action has accrued.
(2) For purposes of this section, the cause of action accrues on the latest of
the following dates:
(a) the last day for filing an appeal from the entry of the final judgment of
conviction, if no appeal is taken;
(b) the entry of the decision of the appellate court which has jurisdiction
over the case, if an appeal is taken;
(c) the last day for filing a petition for writ of certiorari in the Utah
Supreme Court or the United States Supreme Court, if no petition for writ of
certiorari is filed;
(d) the entry of the denial of the petition for writ of certiorari or the
entry of the decision on the petition for certiorari review, if a petition
for writ of certiorari is filed; or
(e) the date on which petitioner knew or should have known, in the exercise
of reasonable diligence, of evidentiary facts on which the petition is based.
(3) If the court finds that the interests of justice require, a court may
excuse a petitioner's failure to file within the time limitations.
(4) Sections 77-19-8, 78-12-35, and 78-12-40 do not extend
period established in this section.

the limitations

Statutes and Constitution are current through end of 2006 legislation
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V\fe&law:
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 65B
WEST'S UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
STATE COURT RULES
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
PART VIII. PROVISIONAL AND FINAL REMEDIES AND SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS
-•RULE 65B. EXTRAORDINARY RELIEF
(a) Availability of Remedy.
Where no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy
is available, a person may petition the court for extraordinary relief on any
of the grounds set forth in paragraph (b) (involving wrongful restraint on
personal liberty), paragraph (c) (involving the wrongful use of public or
corporate authority) or paragraph (d) (involving the wrongful use of judicial
authority, the failure to exercise such authority, and actions by the Board of
Pardons and Parole).
There shall be no special form of writ.
Except for
instances governed by Rule 65C, the procedures in this rule shall govern
proceedings on all petitions for extraordinary relief. To the extent that this
rule does not provide special procedures, proceedings on petitions for
extraordinary relief shall be governed by the procedures set forth elsewhere in
these rules.
(b) Wrongful Restraints on Personal Liberty.
(1) Scope.
Except for instances governed by Rule 65C, this paragraph shall
govern all petitions claiming that a person has been wrongfully restrained of
personal liberty, and the court may grant relief appropriate under this
paragraph.
(2) Commencement.
The proceeding shall be commenced by filing a petition with
the clerk of the court in the district in which the petitioner is restrained or
the respondent resides or in which the alleged restraint is occurring.
(3) Contents

of

the

Petition

and Attachments.

The petition shall contain a

short, plain statement of the facts on the basis of which the petitioner seeks
relief.
It shall identify the respondent and the place where the person is
restrained. It shall state the cause or pretense of the restraint, if known by
the petitioner.
It shall state whether the legality of the restraint has
already been adjudicated in a prior proceeding and, if so, the reasons for the
denial of relief in the prior proceeding.
The petitioner shall attach to the
petition any legal process available to the petitioner that resulted in
restraint.
The petitioner shall also attach to the petition a copy of the
pleadings filed by the petitioner in any prior proceeding that adjudicated the
legality of the restraint.
(4) Memorandum of Authorities.
The petitioner shall not set forth argument or
citations or discuss authorities in the petition, but these may be set out in a
separate memorandum, two copies of which shall be filed with the petition.
(5) Dismissal
of Frivolous
Claims.
On review of the petition, if it is
apparent to the court that the legality of the restraint has already been
adjudicated in a prior proceeding, or if for any other reason any claim in the
petition shall appear frivolous on its face, the court shall forthwith issue an
//web2.west!awxom/print/printstream.aspx?destination=atp&s...=2.0&prid=A0055800000020790005501443BFE053A853D2EA83&rs=WLW6.11
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order dismissing the claim, stating that the
the reasons for this conclusion. The order
conclusions of law.
The order shall be
Proceedings on the claim shall terminate
dismissal.

claim is frivolous on its face and
need not state findings of fact or
sent by mail to the petitioner.
with the entry of the order of

(6) Responsive
Pleadings.
If the petition is not dismissed as being frivolous
on its face, the court shall direct the clerk of the court to serve a copy of
the petition and a copy of any memorandum upon the respondent by mail. At the
same time, the court may issue an order directing the respondent to answer or
otherwise respond to the petition, specifying a time within which the
respondent must comply. If the circumstances require, the court may also issue
an order directing the respondent to appear before the court for a hearing on
the legality of the restraint. An answer to a petition shall state plainly
whether the respondent has restrained the person alleged to have been
restrained, whether the person so restrained has been transferred to any other
person, and if so, the identity of the transferee, the date of the transfer,
and the reason or authority for the transfer. Nothing in this paragraph shall
be construed to prohibit the court from ruling upon the petition based upon a
dispositive motion.
(7) Temporary Relief.
If it appears that the person alleged to be restrained
will be removed from the court's jurisdiction or will suffer irreparable injury
before compliance with the hearing order can be enforced, the court shall issue
a warrant directing the sheriff to bring the respondent before the court to be
dealt with according to law.
Pending a determination of the petition, the
court may place the person alleged to have been restrained in the custody of
such other persons as may be appropriate.
(8) Alternative
Service
of the Hearing Order.
If the respondent cannot be
found, or if it appears that a person other than the respondent has custody of
the person alleged to be restrained, the hearing order and any other process
issued by the court may be served on the person having custody in the manner
and with the same effect as if that person had been named as respondent in the
action.
(9) Avoidance
of Service
by Respondent.
If anyone having custody of the person
alleged to be restrained avoids service of the hearing order or attempts
wrongfully to remove the person from the court's jurisdiction, the sheriff
shall immediately arrest the responsible person. The sheriff shall forthwith
bring the person arrested before the court to be dealt with according to law.
(10) Hearing
or Other
Proceedings.
In the event that the court orders a
hearing, the court shall hear the matter in a summary fashion and shall render
judgment accordingly.
The respondent or other person having custody shall
appear with the person alleged to be restrained or shall state the reasons for
failing to do so. The court may nevertheless direct the respondent to bring
before it the person alleged to be restrained.
If the petitioner waives the
right to be present at the hearing, the court shall modify the hearing order
accordingly. The hearing order shall not be disobeyed for any defect of form
or any misdescription in the order or the petition, if enough is stated to
impart the meaning and intent of the proceeding to the respondent.
(c) Wrongful Use of or Failure to Exercise Public Authority.
(1) Who May Petition

the

Court;

Security.

The attorney general may, and when
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directed to do so by the governor shall, petition the court for relief on the
grounds enumerated in this paragraph.
Any person who is not required to be
represented by the attorney general and who is aggrieved or threatened by one
of the acts enumerated in subparagraph (2) of this paragraph may petition the
court under this paragraph if (A) the person claims to be entitled to an office
unlawfully held by another or (B) if the attorney general fails to file a
petition under this paragraph after receiving notice of the person's claim. A
petition filed by a person other than the attorney general under this paragraph
shall be brought in the name of the petitioner, and the petition shall be
accompanied by an undertaking with sufficient sureties to pay any judgment for
costs and damages that may be recovered against the petitioner in the
proceeding. The sureties shall be in the form for bonds on appeal provided for
in Rule 73.
(2) Grounds for Relief.
Appropriate relief may be granted: (A) where a person
usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public office,
whether civil or military, a franchise, or an office in a corporation created
by the authority of the state of Utah;
(B) where a public officer does or
permits any act that results in a forfeiture of the office; (C) where persons
act as a corporation in the state of Utah without being legally incorporated;
(D) where any corporation has violated the laws of the state of Utah relating
to the creation, alteration or renewal of corporations;
or (E) where any
corporation has forfeited or misused its corporcite rights, privileges or
franchises.
(3) Proceedings
on the Petition.
On the filing of a petition, the court may
require that notice be given to adverse parties before issuing a hearing order,
or may issue a hearing order requiring the adverse party to appear at the
hearing on the merits. The court may also grant temporary relief in accordance
with the terms of Rule 65A.
(d) Wrongful Use of Judicial Authority or Failure to Comply With Duty;
by Board of Pardons and Parole.

Actions

(1) Who May Petition.
A person aggrieved or whose interests are threatened by
any of the acts enumerated in this paragraph may petition the court for relief.
(2) Grounds
for Relief.
Appropriate relief may be granted:
(A) where an
inferior court, administrative agency, or officer exercising judicial functions
has exceeded its jurisdiction or abused its discretion; (B) where an inferior
court, administrative agency, corporation or person has failed to perform an
act required by law as a duty of office, trust or station;
(C) where an
inferior court, administrative agency, corporation or person has refused the
petitioner the use or enjoyment of a right or office to which the petitioner is
entitled;
or (D) where the Board of Pardons and Parole has exceeded its
jurisdiction or failed to perform an act required by constitutional or
statutory law.
(3) Proceedings
on the Petition.
On the filing of a petition, the court may
require that notice be given to adverse parties before issuing a hearing order,
or may issue a hearing order requiring the adverse party to appear at the
hearing on the merits. The court may direct the inferior court, administrative
agency, officer, corporation or other person named as respondent to deliver to
the court a transcript or other record of the proceedings. The court may also
grant temporary relief in accordance with the terms of Rule 65A.
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(4) Scope of Review.
Where the challenged proceedings are judicial in nature,
the court's review shall not extend further than to determine whether the
respondent has regularly pursued its authority.
Current
2006

with

amendments

effective

November

1,

Copr © 2006 Thomson/West

END OF DOCUMENT
© 2006 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.

web2.westlawxom/print/printstream.aspx?destination=atp&s...=2.0&prid=A0055800000020790005501443BFE053A853D2EA83&rs=WLW6.11

Page 4 of 4

V\fesflaw
UT R RCRP Rule 11
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 11
WESTS UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
STATE COURT RULES
UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
-•RULE 11. PLEAS
(a) Upon arraignment, except for an infraction, a defendant shall be represented by counsel, unless the defendant waives
counsel in open court. The defendant shall not be required to plead until the defendant has had a reasonable time to
confer with counsel.
(b) A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty, no contest, not guilty by reason of insanity, or guilty and mentally ill. A
defendant may plead in the alternative not guilty or not guilty by reason of insanity. If a defendant refuses to plead or if
a defendant corporation fails to appear, the court shall enter a plea of not guilty.
(c) A defendant may plead no contest only with the consent of the court.
(d) When a defendant enters a plea of not guilty, the case shall forthwith be set for trial. A defendant unable to make
bail shall be given a preference for an early trial. In cases other than felonies the court shall advise the defendant, or
counsel, of the requirements for making a written demand for a jury trial.
(e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and mentally ill, and may not accept the plea
until the court has found:
(e)(1) if the defendant is not represented by counsel, he or she has knowingly waived the right to counsel and does not
desire counsel;
(e)(2) the plea is voluntarily made;
(e)(3) the defendant knows of the right to the presumption of innocence, the right against compulsory self-incrimination,
the right to a speedy public trial before an impartial jury, the right to confront and cross-examine in open court the
prosecution witnesses, the right to compel the attendance of defense witnesses, and that by entering the plea, these rights
are waived;
(e)(4)(A) the defendant understands the nature and elements of the offense to which the plea is entered, that upon trial
the prosecution would have the burden of proving each of those elements beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the plea is
an admission of all those elements;
(e)(4)(B) there is a factual basis for the plea. A factual basis is sufficient if it establishes that the charged crime was
actually committed by the defendant or, if the defendant refuses or is otherwise unable to admit culpability, that the
prosecution has sufficient evidence to establish a substantial risk of conviction;
(e)(5) the defendant knows the minimum and maximum sentence, and if applicable, the minimum mandatory nature of
the minimum sentence, that may be imposed for each offense to which a plea is entered, including the possibility of the
imposition of consecutive sentences;
(e)(6) if the tendered plea is a result of a prior plea discussion and plea agreement, and if so, what agreement has been
reached;
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(e)(7) the defendant has been advised of the time limits for filing any motion to withdraw the plea; and
(e)(8) the defendant has been advised that the right of appeal is limited.
These findings may be based on questioning of the defendant on the record or, if used, a written statement reciting these
factors after the court has established that the defendant has read, understood, and acknowledged the contents of the
statement. If the defendant cannot understand the English language, it will be sufficient that the statement has been read
or translated to the defendant.
Unless specifically required by statute or rule, a court is not required to inquire into or advise concerning any collateral
consequences of a plea.
(f) Failure to advise the defendant of the time limits for filing any motion to withdraw a plea of guilty, no contest or
guilty and mentally ill is not a ground for setting the plea aside, but may be the ground for extending the time to make a
motion under Section 77-13-6.
(g)(1) If it appears that the prosecuting attorney or any other party has agreed to request or recommend the acceptance of
a plea to a lesser included offense, or the dismissal of other charges, the agreement shall be approved or rejected by the
court.
(g)(2) If sentencing recommendations are allowed by the court, the court shall advise the defendant personally that any
recommendation as to sentence is not binding on the court.
(h)(1) The judge shall not participate in plea discussions prior to any plea agreement being made by the prosecuting
attorney.
(h)(2) When a tentative plea agreement has been reached, the judge, upon request of the parties, may permit the
disclosure of the tentative agreement and the reasons for it, in advance of the time for tender of the plea. The judge may
then indicate to the prosecuting attorney and defense counsel whether the proposed disposition will be approved.
(h)(3) If the judge then decides that final disposition should not be in conformity with the plea agreement, the judge shall
advise the defendant and then call upon the defendant to either affirm or withdraw the plea.
(i) With approval of the court and the consent of the prosecution, a defendant may enter a conditional plea of guilty,
guilty and mentally ill, or no contest, reserving in the record the right, on appeal from the judgment, to a review of the
adverse determination of any specified pre-trial motion. A defendant who prevails on appeal shall be allowed to
withdraw the plea.
(j) When a defendant tenders a plea of guilty and mentally ill, in addition to the other requirements of this rule, the court
shall hold a hearing within a reasonable time to determine if the defendant is mentally ill in accordance with Utah Code
Ann. §77-16a-103.
(k) Compliance with this rule shall be determined by examining the record as a whole. Any variance from the
procedures required by this rule which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded. Failure to comply with this
rule is not, by itself, sufficient grounds for a collateral attack on a guilty plea.
Current with amendments effective November 1,2006
Copr © 2006 Thomson/West
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Wstlaw;
Rules A p p . P r o c , Rule 11
WEST'S UTAH COURT RULES ANNOTATED
STATE COURT RULES
UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE
TITLE II. APPEALS FROM JUDGMENTS AND ORDERS OF TRIAL COURTS
-•RULE 11. THE RECORD ON APPEAL.
(a) Composition of the record on appeal.
The original papers and exhibits
filed in the trial court, including the presentence report in criminal matters,
the transcript of proceedings, if any, the index prepared by the clerk of the
trial court, and the docket sheet, shall constitute the record on appeal in all
cases.
A copy of the record certified by the clerk of the trial court to
conform to the original may be substituted for the original as the record on
appeal. Only those papers prescribed under paragraph (d) of this rule shall be
transmitted to the appellate court.
(b) Pagination and indexing of record.
(b)(1) Immediately upon filing of the notice of appeal, the clerk of the trial
court shall securely fasten the record in a trial court case file, with
collation in the following order:
(b)(1)(A) the index prepared by the clerk;
(b)(1)(B) the docket sheet;
(b)(1)(C) all original papers in chronological order;
(b)(1)(D) all published depositions in chronological order;
(b)(1)(E) all transcripts prepared for appeal in chronological order;
(b)(1)(F) a list of all exhibits offered in the proceeding; and
(b)(1)(G) in criminal cases, the presentence investigation report.
(b)(2)(A) The clerk shall mark the bottom right corner of every page of the
collated index, docket sheet, and all original papers as well as the cover page
only of all published depositions and the cover page only of each volume of
transcripts constituting the record with a sequential number using one series
of numerals for the entire record.
(b)(2)(B) If a supplemental record is forwarded to the appellate court, the
clerk shall collate the papers, depositions, and transcripts of the
supplemental record in the same order as the original record and mark the
bottom right corner of each page of the collated original papers as well as the
cover page only of all published depositions and the cover page only of each
volume of transcripts constituting the supplemental record with a sequential
number beginning with the number next following the number of the last page of
the original record.
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(b)(3) The clerk shall prepare a chronological index of the record.
The index
shall contain a reference to the date on which the paper, deposition or
transcript was filed in the trial court and the starting page of the record on
which the paper, deposition or transcript will be found.
(b)(4) Clerks of the trial and appellate courts shall establish rules and
procedures for checking out the record after pagination for use by the parties
in preparing briefs for an appeal or in preparing or briefing a petition for
writ of certiorari.
(c) Duty of appellant. After filing the notice of appeal, the appellant, or in
the event that more than one appeal is taken, each appellant, shall comply with
the provisions of paragraphs (d) and (e) of this rule and shall take any other
action necessary to enable the clerk of the trial court to assemble and
transmit the record. A single record shall be transmitted.
(d) Papers on appeal.
(d)(1) Criminal
cases.
All of the papers in a criminal case shall be included
by the clerk of the trial court as part of the record on appeal.
(d)(2) Civil
cases.
Unless otherwise directed by the appellate court upon sua
sponte motion or motion of a party, the clerk of the trial court shall include
all of the papers in a civil case as part of the record on appeal.
(d)(3) Agency cases.
Unless otherwise directed by the appellate court upon sua
sponte motion or motion of a party, the agency shall include all papers in the
agency file as part of the record.
(e) The transcript of proceedings; duty
appellee if partial transcript is ordered.

of

appellant

to

order; notice to

(e)(1) Request
for transcript;
time for filing.
Within 10 days after filing
the notice of appeal, the appellant shall request from the court executive a
transcript of such parts of the proceedings not already on file as the
appellant deems necessary.
The request shall be in writing and shall state
that the transcript is needed for purposes of an appeal.
Within the same
period, a copy shall be filed with the clerk of the trial court and the clerk
of the appellate court. If the appellant desires a transcript in a compressed
format, appellant shall include the request for a compressed format within the
request for transcript.
If no such parts of the proceedings are to be
requested, within the same period the appellant shall file a certificate to
that effect with the clerk of the trial court and a copy with the clerk of the
appellate court.

(e)(2) Transcript

required

of

all

evidence

regarding

challenged

finding

or

conclusion.
If the appellant intends to urge on appeal that a finding or
conclusion is unsupported by or is contrary to the evidence, the appellant
shall include in the record a transcript of all evidence relevant to such
finding or conclusion.
Neither the court nor the appellee is obligated to
correct appellant's deficiencies in providing the relevant portions of the
transcript.

(e)(3) Statement

of

issues;

cross-designation

by appellee.

Unless the entire

transcript is to be included, the appellant shall, within 10 days after filing
the notice of appeal, file a statement of the issues that will be presented on
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appeal and shall serve on the appellee a copy of the request or certificate and
a copy of the statement. If the appellee deems a transcript of other parts of
the proceedings to be necessary, the appellee shall, within 10 days after the
service of the request or certificate and the statement of the appellant, file
and serve on the appellant a designation of additional parts to be included.
Unless within 10 days after service of such designation the appellant has
requested such parts and has so notified the appellee, the appellee may within
the following 10 days either request the parts or move in the trial court for
an order requiring the appellant to do so.
(f) Agreed statement as the record on appeal. In lieu of the record on appeal
as defined in paragraph (a) of this rule, the parties may prepare and sign a
statement of the case, showing how the issues presented by the appeal arose and
were decided in the trial court and setting forth only so many of the facts
averred and proved or sought to be proved as are essential to a decision of the
issues presented.
If the statement conforms to the truth, it, together with
such additions as the trial court may consider necessary fully to present the
issues raised by the appeal, shall be approved by the trial court. The clerk
of the trial court shall transmit the statement to the clerk of the appellate
court within the time prescribed by Rule 12(b)(2).
The clerk of the trial
court shall transmit the index of the record to the clerk of the appellate
court upon approval of the statement by the trial court.
(g) Statement of evidence or proceedings when no report was made or when
transcript is unavailable.
If no report of the evidence or proceedings at a
hearing or trial was made, or if a transcript is unavailable, or if the
appellant is impecunious and unable to afford a transcript in a civil case, the
appellant may prepare a statement of the evidence or proceedings from the best
available means, including recollection. The statement shall be served on the
appellee, who may serve objections or propose amendments within 10 days after
service.
The statement and any objections or proposed amendments shall be
submitted to the trial court for settlement and approval and, as settled and
approved, shall be included by the clerk of the trial court in the record on
appeal.
(h) Correction or modification of the record. If any difference arises as to
whether the record truly discloses what occurred in the trial court, the
difference shall be submitted to and settled by that court and the record made
to conform to the truth. If anything material to either party is omitted from
the record by error or accident or is misstated, the parties by stipulation,
the trial court, or the appellate court, either before or after the record is
transmitted, may direct that the omission or misstatement be corrected and if
necessary that a supplemental record be certified and transmitted. The moving
party, or the court if it is acting on its own initiative, shall serve on the
parties a statement of the proposed changes. Within 10 days after service, any
party may serve objections to the proposed changes. All other questions as to
the form and content of the record shall be presented to the appellate court.
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